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Abstract
Motivated by applications in Game Theory, Optimization, and Generative Adversarial
Networks, recent work of Daskalakis et al [8] and follow-up work of Liang and Stokes [11]
have established that a variant of the widely used Gradient Descent/Ascent procedure, called
“Optimistic Gradient Descent/Ascent (OGDA)”, exhibits last-iterate convergence to saddle points
in unconstrained convex-concave min-max optimization problems. We show that the same
holds true in the more general problem of constrained min-max optimization under a variant of
the no-regret Multiplicative-Weights-Update method called “Optimistic Multiplicative-Weights
Update (OMWU)”. This answers an open question of Syrgkanis et al [19].
The proof of our result requires fundamentally different techniques from those that exist in
no-regret learning literature and the aforementioned papers. We show that OMWU monotonically
improves the Kullback-Leibler divergence of the current iterate to the (appropriately normalized)
min-max solution until it enters a neighborhood of the solution. Inside that neighborhood we
show that OMWU becomes a contracting map converging to the exact solution. We believe that
our techniques will be useful in the analysis of the last iterate of other learning algorithms.
1 Introduction
A central problem in Game Theory and Optimization is computing a pair of probability vectors
(x,y), solving
min
y∈∆m
max
x∈∆n
x>Ay, (1)
where ∆n ⊂ Rn and ∆m ⊂ Rm are probability simplices, and A is a n×m matrix. Von Neumann’s
celebrated minimax theorem informs us that
min
y∈∆m
max
x∈∆n
x>Ay = max
x∈∆n
min
y∈∆m
x>Ay, (2)
and that all solutions to the LHS are solutions to the RHS, and vice versa. This result was a
founding stone in the development of Game Theory. Indeed, interpreting x>Ay as the payment of
the “min player” to the “max player” when the former selects a distribution y over columns and
the latter selects a distribution x over rows of matrix A, a solution to (1) constitutes an equilibrium
of the game defined by matrix A, called a “minimax equilibrium”, a pair of randomized strategies
such that neither player can improve their payoff by unilaterally changing their distribution.
Besides their fundamental value for Game Theory, it is known that (1) and (2) are also intimately
related to Linear Programming. It was shown by von Neumann that (2) follows from strong linear
programming duality. Moreover, it was suggested by Dantzig [7] and recently proven by Adler [1]
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that any linear program can be solved by solving some min-max problem of the form (1). In
particular, min-max problems of form (1) are exactly as expressive as min-max problems of the
following form, which capture any linear program (by Lagrangifying the constraints):
min
y≥0
max
x≥0
(
x>Ay + b>x + c>y
)
. (3)
Soon after the minimax theorem was proven and its connection to linear programming was forged,
researchers proposed dynamics for solving min-max optimization problems by having the min and
max players of (1) run a simple learning procedure in tandem. An early method, proposed by
Brown [4] and analyzed by Robinson [18], was fictitious play. Soon after, Blackwell’s approachability
theorem [3] propelled the field of online learning, which lead to the discovery of several learning
algorithms converging to minimax equilibrium at faster rates, while also being robust to adversarial
environments, situations where one of the players of the game deviates from the prescribed dynamics;
see e.g. [5]. These learning methods, called “no-regret”, include the celebrated multiplicative-
weights-update method, follow-the-regularized-leader, and follow-the-perturbed-leader. Compared
to centralized linear programming procedures the advantage of these methods is the simplicity of
executing their steps, and their robustness to adversarial environments, as we just discussed.
Last vs Average Iterate Convergence. Despite the extensive literature on no-regret learning,
an unsatisfactory feature of known results is that min-max equilibrium is shown to be attained only
in an average sense. To be precise, if (xt,yt) is the trajectory of a no-regret learning method, it is
usually shown that the average 1t
∑
τ≤t x
τ>Ayτ converges to the optimal value of (1), as t→∞.
Moreover, if the solution to (1) is unique, then 1t
∑
τ≤t(x
τ ,yτ ) converges to the optimal solution.
Unfortunately that does not mean that the last iterate (xt,yt) converges to an optimal solution,
and indeed it commonly diverges or enters a limit cycle. Furthermore, in the optimization literature,
Nesterov [15] provides a method that can give pointwise convergence (i.e., convergence of the last
iterate) to problem (1)1, however his algorithm is not a no-regret learning algorithm. Recent work
by Daskalakis et al [8] and Liang and Stokes [11] studies whether last iterate convergence can be
established for no-regret learning methods in the simple unconstrained min-max problem of the
form:
min
y∈Rm
max
x∈Rn
(
x>Ay + b>x + c>y
)
. (4)
For this problem, it is known that Gradient Descent/Ascent (GDA) is a no-regret learning procedure,
corresponding to follow-the-regularized leader (FTRL) with `22-regularization. As such, the average
trajectory traveled by GDA converges to a min-max solution, in the afore-described sense. On the
other hand, it is also known that GDA may diverge from the min-max solution, even in trivial
cases such as A = I, n = m = 1, b = c = 0. Interestingly, [8, 11] show that a variant of GDA, called
“Optimistic Gradient Descent/Ascent (OGDA),2 exhibits last iterate convergence. Inspired by their
theoretical result for the performance of OGDA in (4), Daskalakis et al. [8] even propose the use of
OGDA for training Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [10]. Moreover, Syrgkanis et al. [19]
provide numerical experiments which indicate that the trajectories of Optimistic Hedge (variant of
Hedge in the same way OGDA is a variant of GDA) stabilize (i.e., converge pointwise) as opposed to
(classic) Hedge and they posed the question whether Optimistic Hedge actually converges pointwise.
1Nesterov showed that by optimizing fµ(x) := µ ln(
1
m
∑m
j=1 e
− 1
µ
(Ax)j ), gν(x) := ν ln(
1
n
∑n
j=1 e
1
ν
(A>y)j ) for µ =
Θ( 
logm
), ν = Θ( 
logn
) yields an O() approximation to the problem problem (1).
2OGDA is tantamount to Optimistic FTRL with `22-regularization, in the same way that GDA is tantamount to
FTRL with `22-regularization; see e.g. [17]. OGDA essentially boils down to GDA with negative momentum.
2
Motivated by the afore-described lines of work, and the importance of last iterate convergence for
Game Theory and the modern applications of GDA-style methods in Optimization, our goal in this
work is to generalize the results of [8, 11] to the general min-max problem (3), or equivalently (1);
indeed, we will focus on the latter, but our algorithms are readily applicable to the former as the
two problems are equivalent [1]. With the constraint that (x,y) should remain in ∆n ×∆m, GDA
and OGDA are not applicable. Indeed, the natural GDA-style method for min-max problems in
this case is the celebrated Multiplicative-Weights-Update (MWU) method, which is tantamount
to FTRL with entropy-regularization. Unsurprisingly, in the same way that GDA suffers in the
unconstrained problem (4), MWU exhibits cycling in the constrained problem (1) (a recent work is
[2] and was also shown empirically in [19]). So it is natural for us to study instead its optimistic
variant, “Optimistic Multiplicative-Weights-Update (OMWU),” (called Optimistic Hedge in [19])
which corresponds to Optimistic FTRL with entropy-regularization, the equations of which are
given in Section 2.2. Our main result is the following (restated as Theorem 2.7 after Section 2.2)
and answers an open question asked in [19] as applicable to two player zero sum games:
Theorem 1.1 (Last-Iterate Convergence of OMWU). Whenever (1) has a unique optimal
solution (x∗,y∗), OMWU with a small enough learning rate and initialized at the pair of uniform
distributions ( 1n1,
1
m1) exhibits last-iterate convergence to the optimal solution. That is, if (x
t,yt)
are the vectors maintained by OMWU at step t, then limt→∞(xt,yt) = (x∗,y∗).
Remark 1.2. We note that the assumption about uniqueness of the optimal solution for problem (1)
is generic in the following sense: Within the set of all zero-sum games, the set of zero-sum games
with non-unique equilibrium has Lebesgue measure zero [2, 6]. This implies that if A’s entries are
sampled independently from some continuous distribution, then with probability one the min-max
problem (1) will have a unique solution.
Our paper provides two important messages:
• It strengthens the intuition that optimism helps the trajectories of learning dynamics stabilize
(e.g., Optimistic MWU vs MWU or Optimistic GDA vs GDA; as the papers of Syrgkanis et
al [19] and Daskalakis et al [8] also do).
• The techniques we use (typically appear in dynamical systems literature) to prove convergence
for the last iterate, are fundamentally different from those commonly used to prove convergence
of the time average of a learning algorithm.
Notation: Vectors in ∆n,∆m are denoted in boldface x,y. Time indices are denoted by superscripts.
Thus, a time indexed vector x at time t is denoted as xt. We use the letter J to denote the Jacobian
of a function (with appropriate subscript), I,0,1 to denote the identity, zero matrix and all ones
vector respectively with appropriate subscripts to indicate the size. Moreover, (Ay)i captures∑
j Aijyj . The support of x is denoted by Supp(x). Finally we use (x
∗,y∗) to denote the optimal
solution for the min-max problem (1) and [n] to denote {1, ..., n}.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Definitions and facts
Dynamical Systems. A recurrence relation of the form xt+1 = w(xt) is a discrete time dynamical
system, with update rule w : S → S where S = ∆n ×∆m ×∆n ×∆m for our purposes. The point z
is called a fixed point or equilibrium of w if w(z) = z. We will be interested in the following well
known fact that will be used in our proofs.
3
Proposition 2.1 (e.g. [9]). If the Jacobian of the update rule w3 at a fixed point z has spectral
radius less than one, then there exists a neighborhood U around z such that for all x ∈ U , the
dynamics converges to z, i.e., limn→∞wn(x) = z. We call w a contraction mapping in U .
2.2 OMWU Method
Our main contribution is that the last iterate of OMWU converges to the optimal solution. The
OMWU dynamics is defined as follows (t ≥ 1):
xt+1i = x
t
i
e2η(Ay
t)i−η(Ayt−1)i∑n
j=1 x
t
je
2η(Ayt)j−η(Ayt−1)j
for all i ∈ [n],
yt+1i = y
t
i
e−2η(A
>xt)i+η(A>xt−1)i∑m
j=1 y
t
je
−2η(A>xt)j+η(A>xt−1)j
for all i ∈ [m].
(5)
Points (x1,y1), (x0,y0) are the initial conditions and are given as input. We call 0 < η < 1 the
stepsize of the dynamics. It is more convenient to interpret OMWU dynamics as mapping a quadruple
to quadruple ((xt,yt,xt−1,yt−1)→ (xt+1,yt+1,xt,yt), see Section 3.2 for the construction of the
dynamical system).
Remark 2.2. Let (x∗,y∗) be the optimal solution. We see that (x∗,y∗,x∗,y∗) is a fixed point
of the mapping. Furthermore, ∆n ×∆m ×∆n ×∆m is invariant under OMWU dynamics. For
t ≥ 1, if xti = 0 then xi remains zero for all times greater than t, and if it is positive, it remains
positive (both numerator and denominator are positive) 4. In words, at all times the OMWU
satisfies the non-negativity constraints and the renormalization factor (denominator) makes both
x,y’s coordinates sum up to one. A last observation is that every fixed point of OMWU dynamics
(mapping a quadruple to quadruple) has the form (x,y,x,y) (two same copies). Equation (8) shows
how to express OMWU dynamics as a dynamical system.
2.3 Linear Variant of OMWU
We provide the linear variant of OMWU dynamics (5) because we use it in some intermediate
lemmas (appear in appendix).
xt+1i = x
t
i
1+2η(Ayt)i−η(Ayt−1)i∑n
j=1 x
t
j(1+2η(Ay
t)j−η(Ayt−1)j) for all i ∈ [n],
yt+1i = y
t
i
1−2η(A>xt)i+η(A>xt−1)i∑m
j=1 y
t
j(1−2η(A>xt)j+η(A>xt−1)j)
for all i ∈ [m]. (6)
This dynamics is derived by considering the first order approximation of the exponential function.
Stepsize η in this case should be chosen sufficiently small so that both numerator and denominator
are positive.
2.4 More definitions and statement of our result
Definition 2.3 ([12]). Assume α > 0. We call a point (x,y) ∈ ∆n ×∆m α-close if for each i we
have that xi ≤ α or |x>Ay − (Ay)i| ≤ α and for each j it holds yj ≤ α or |x>Ay − (A>x)j | ≤ α.
Remark 2.4. Think of α-close points as α-approximate optimal solutions for min-max problems
that are induced by submatrices of A (α-approximate stationary points). Moreover, if (x,y) is
0-close point does not necessarily imply (x,y) is the optimal solution of problem (1)!
3We assume w is a continuously differential function.
4Same holds for vector y.
4
Definition 2.5 (Approximate solution). Assume  > 0. We call a point (x,y) ∈ ∆n × ∆m -
approximate (or -approximate Nash equilibrium) if for all x˜ ∈ ∆n we get that x˜>Ay ≤ x>Ay + 
(max player deviates) and for all y˜ ∈ ∆m we get that x>Ay˜ ≥ x>Ay −  (min player deviates).
Remark 2.6. Think of -approximate points as approximate optimal solutions to the min-max
problem (1). Moreover, if (x,y) is 0-approximate then (x,y) is the optimal solution of problem (1).
Statement of our results. We finish the preliminary section by stating formally the main result.
Theorem 2.7 (OMWU converges). Let A be a n×m matrix and assume that
min
y∈∆m
max
x∈∆n
x>Ay
has a unique solution (x∗,y∗). It holds that for η sufficiently small (depends on n,m,A), starting
from the uniform distribution, i.e., (x1,y1) = (x0,y0) = ( 1n1,
1
m1), it holds
lim
t→∞(x
t,yt) = (x∗,y∗),
under OMWU dynamics. The stepsize η is constant, i.e., does not scale with time5.
We need to note that it is not clear from our theorem how small η is and its dependence on the
size of A. Nevertheless, our convergence result holds for constant stepsizes as opposed to the classic
no-regret learning literature where η scales like 1√
T
after T iterations. Another result we know of
this flavor is about MWU algorithm on congestion games [16].
3 Last iterate convergence of OMWU
In this section we show our main result (Theorem 2.7), by breaking the proof into three key theorems.
The first theorem says that KL divergence from the t-th iterate (xt,yt) to the optimal solution
(x∗,y∗), i.e., (sum of KL divergences to be exact)∑
i
x∗i ln(x
∗
i /x
t
i) +
∑
i
y∗i ln(y
∗
i /y
t
i),
decreases with time t ≥ 2 by at least a factor of η3 per iteration, unless the iterate (xt,yt) is
O(η1/3)-close (see Definition 2.3). Moreover, provided that the stepsize η is small enough, we can
show the structural result that (xt,yt) lies in a neighborhood of (x∗,y∗) that becomes smaller and
smaller as η → 0. Finally, as long as OMWU dynamics has reached a small neighborhood around
(x∗,y∗), we show that the update rule of the dynamical system induced by OMWU is contracting,
and the last iterate convergence result follows. Formally we show:
Theorem 3.1 (KL decreasing). Let (x∗,y∗) be the unique optimal solution of problem (1) and η
sufficiently small. Then
DKL((x
∗,y∗)||(xt,yt))
is decreasing with time t by (at least) Ω(η3) unless (xt,yt) is O(η1/3)-close.
5Our proof also works if the starting points (x1,y1), (x0,y0) are both in the interior of ∆n×∆m and not necessarily
uniform, however the choice of η depends on the initial distributions as well and not only on n,m,A.
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Theorem 3.2 (η1/3-close implies close to optimum in `1). Assume that (x
∗,y∗) is unique optimal
solution of the problem (1). Let T (depends on η) be the first time KL divergence does not decrease
by Ω(η3). It follows that as η → 0, the η1/3-close point (xT ,yT ) has distance from (x∗,y∗) that goes
to zero, i.e., limη→0
∥∥(x∗,y∗)− (xT ,yT )∥∥
1
= 0.
Theorem 3.3 (OMWU is a contraction). Let (x∗,y∗) be the unique optimal solution to the min-max
problem (1). There exists a neighborhood U ⊂ ∆n × ∆m × ∆n × ∆m of (x∗,y∗,x∗,y∗)6 so that
for all (x1,y1,x0,y0) ∈ U we have that limt→∞(xt,yt,xt−1,yt−1) = (x∗,y∗,x∗,y∗) under OMWU
dynamics as defined in (5) and (8) (Section 3.2).
Assuming these three theorems, our main result is straightforward.
Proof of Theorem 2.7. Let η be sufficiently small. If (x1,y1) = ( 1n1,
1
m1) (starting point is uniform)
then an easy upper bound (by removing negative terms) on KL divergence from (x1,y1) to (x∗,y∗)
is −∑ni=1 x∗i log x1i +∑mi=1 y∗i log y1i = log(nm). Therefore using Theorem 3.1 we have that after
at most T that is O( log(nm)
η3
) steps, OMWU reaches a O(η1/3)-close point (T is the first time so
that KL divergence from current iterate to optimal solution (x∗,y∗) has not decreased by at least
a factor of η3) or the KL divergence between the optimal solution and (xT ,yT ) is O(η3) (KL
divergence was decreasing by at least a factor of η3 for all iterations until the iterate reached a `1
distance O(η3)). In the latter case it follows
∥∥(x∗,y∗)− (xT ,yT )∥∥2
1
is O(η3) and hence (xT ,yT ) is
O(η3/2) in `1 distance from the optimal solution, therefore for small η, (x
T+1,yT+1,xT ,yT ) is in
the neighborhood U that is needed for contraction (Theorem 3.3). In the former case, by Theorem
3.2 (for η sufficiently small) it follows that (xT+1,yT+1,xT ,yT ) is also in the neighborhood U that
is needed for contraction (Theorem 3.3)7. The proof follows by Theorem 3.3.
In the next subsections we will provide the proofs to all three key theorems.
3.1 KL decreases and OMWU reaches neighborhood
In this subsection we argue about the proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. The inequality we managed
to prove (see in the appendix the proof of Theorem 3.1) is the following:
DKL((x
∗,y∗)||(xt+1,yt+1))−DKL((x∗,y∗)||(xt,yt)) ≤
−∑ni=1 xti ((12 −O(η))η2 (2(Ayt)i − 2xt >Ayt − (Ayt−1)i + xt >Ayt−1)2)
−∑mi=1 yti ((12 −O(η))η2 (2(A>xt)i − 2xt >Ayt − (A>xt−1)i + xt−1 >Ayt)2)+O(η3). (7)
The proof of the inequality is quite long, we choose to provide intuition and skip the details. We
refer to the appendix for a proof. The inequality says that OMWU dynamics has a good progress
(KL divergence decreases by at least a factor of η3) as long as the current and previous iterate
(xt,yt), (xt−1,yt−1) are not α-close for α chosen to be O(η1/3). This situation appears a lot in
gradient methods when the dynamics is close to a stationary point, the gradient of f is small and
the progress is small as opposed to the case where the gradient of f is big and there is satisfying
progress. The RHS of inequality (7) captures the “distance” from stationarity. Thus, as long as
we are not close to a stationary point (i.e., O(η1/3)-close) in a time window between 1,2,...,k, KL
divergence from current iterate (k-th) to the optimum has decreased by (at least) Ω(kη3) compared
to KL divergence from first iterate to the optimum.
6Since (x∗,y∗,x∗,y∗) might be on the boundary of ∆n ×∆m ×∆n ×∆m, U is the intersection of an open ball
around (x∗,y∗,x∗,y∗) with ∆n ×∆m ×∆n ×∆m.
7In both cases we used that iterate (xT ,yT ) and (xT+1,yT+1) have `1 distance O(η), this is Lemma B.1.
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Moreover, suppose that at some point of OMWU dynamics, KL divergence from current iterate
to the optimum did not decrease by at least a factor of η3 and let T be the iteration this happened.
As we have already argued, (xT ,yT ) is a O(η1/3)-close point. We can show that as long as η
is sufficiently small, then for all i, j in the support of (x∗,y∗), xTi , y
T
j are (at least) Ω(η
1/3) i.e.,
coordinates in the support of the optimum will have non negligible probability in (xT ,yT ). Formally:
Lemma 3.4. Let i ∈ Supp(x∗) and j ∈ Supp(y∗). It holds that xTi ≥ 12η1/3 and yTi ≥ 12η1/3 as long
as
η1/3 ≤ min
s∈Supp(x∗)
1
(nm)1/x∗s
, min
s∈Supp(y∗)
1
(nm)1/y∗s
.
Proof. By definition of T , the KL divergence is decreasing for 2 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, thus
DKL((x
∗,y∗)||(xT−1,yT−1)) < DKL((x∗,y∗)||(x1,y1)).
Therefore x∗i log
1
xT−1i
<
∑
i x
∗
i log
1
x1i
+
∑
i y
∗
j log
1
y1j
= log(mn). It follows that xTi > 1/(mn)
1
x∗
i ≥ η1/3
for x∗i > 0 (i ∈ Supp(x∗)). Since |xTi − xT−1i | is O(η) (Lemma B.1) the result follows. Similarly, the
argument works for yTj .
Lemma 3.4 indicates that the stepsize η might have to be exponentially small in the dimension
(OMWU dynamics is slow when η is very small). We can now prove Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. From Lemma 3.4 and definition of T , we get that |(AyT )i − xT >AyT | is
O(η1/3) for all i in the support of x∗ and |(A>xT )j −xT >AyT | is O(η1/3) for all j in the support of
y∗. We consider (wT , zT ) to be the projection of the point (xT ,yT ) by removing all the coordinates
that have probability mass less than 12η
1/3 and rescale so that the coordinates sum up to one.
We restrict ourselves to the corresponding subproblem (submatrix). It is clear that (wT , zT )
is a O(η1/3)-approximate solution 8 for the subproblem. Let v = x∗Ay∗ be the optimal value. By
uniqueness of the optimal solution, we get that (Ay∗)i = v for all i ∈ Supp(x∗) and (Ay∗)i < v
otherwise (check Lemma C.3 in paper [13] for a proof, where they use Farkas’ lemma to show it,
we use this fact later in Section 3.2). Similarly (A>x∗)j = v for the min player y if j lies in the
support of y∗ and (A>x∗)j > v otherwise. We choose η so small that every O(η1/3)-approximate
solution (x,y) has the property that (Ay)i ≤ v − η1/4, (A>x)j ≥ v + η1/4 for all i /∈ Supp(x∗) and
j /∈ Supp(y∗) respectively (this is possible by continuity of the bilinear function and Claim 3.5
below). Hence we conclude that if η is small enough, the coordinates in the vector (wT , zT ) that
are not in the support of the optimal solution (since η1/4  η1/3), should have probability mass
O(η1/3) at time T .
Claim 3.5. Let (x∗,y∗) be the unique optimal solution to the problem (1). For every  > 0, there
exists an δ() > 0 so that for every δ-approximate solution (x,y) we get that |xi − x∗i | <  for all
i ∈ [n]. Analogously holds for player y.
Proof. We will prove this by contradiction. Assume there is an  that violates this statement. We
choose a sequence δk so that limk→∞ δk = 0 and also there is a sequence (xk,yk) of δk-approximate
Nash equilibrium with |xk,i−x∗i | ≥  for some strategy i. Since ∆n×∆m is compact and the sequence
above is bounded, there is a convergent subsequence. The limit of the convergent subsequence
is a Nash equilibrium by definition of δ-approximate (Definition 2.5). By uniqueness it follows
that the i-th coordinate of the convergent sequence must converge to x∗i , hence we reached a
contradiction.
8By -approximate optimal solution we mean the -approximate Nash equilibrium notion (additive), see Definition
2.5.
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Therefore, if we restrict to the subproblem induced by the strategies in the support of (x∗,y∗),
the projected vector (wT , zT ) is a O(η1/3)-approximate solution of the subgame.
From Claim 3.5, as η → 0 it follows that the `1 distance (any distance suffices) between the
projected (wT , zT ) and the optimal solution (Nash equilibrium) of the subgame goes to zero. Since
the optimal solution of the subgame is exactly the same as the optimal solution of the original game
we get that as η → 0, (xT ,yT ) reaches (x∗,y∗). In particular, since ∥∥(xT+1,yT+1)− (xT ,yT )∥∥
1
is
O(η) (see Lemma B.1) there exists a η small so that (xT+1,yT+1,xT ,yT ) is inside the necessary
neighborhood U of (x∗,y∗,x∗,y∗) that gives contraction (Theorem 3.3).
3.2 Proving contraction
The purpose of this section is to prove Theorem 3.3. To show contraction of OMWU dynamics in a
neighborhood of the optimal solution (x∗,y∗), we first construct a dynamical system that captures
OMWU. Moreover, we prove that the Jacobian of the update rule of that particular dynamical
system computed at the optimal solution, has spectral radius less than one. This suffices to prove
contraction (see Proposition 2.1). As a result, as long as OMWU reaches a small neighborhood of
(x∗,y∗,x∗,y∗), it converges pointwise (last iterate convergence) to it9. Below we provide the update
rule g of the dynamical system, which consists of 4 components:
g(x,y, z,w) := (g1(x,y, z,w), g2(x,y, z,w), g3(x,y, z,w), g4(x,y, z,w)),
g1,i(x,y, z,w) := (g1(x,y, z,w))i := xi
e2η(Ay)i−η(Aw)i∑
t xte
2η(Ay)t−η(Aw)t for all i ∈ [n],
g2,i(x,y, z,w) := (g2(x,y, z,w))i := yi
e−2η(A
>x)i+η(A>z)i∑
t yte
−2η(A>x)t+η(A>z)t
for all i ∈ [m],
g3(x,y, z,w) := In×nx,
g4(x,y, z,w) := Im×my.
(8)
It is not hard to check that
(xt+1,yt+1,xt,yt) = g(xt,yt,xt−1,yt−1),
so g captures exactly the dynamics of OMWU (5). The equations of the Jacobian of g can be found
in the appendix (see Section A).
Spectral analysis the Jacobian of OMWU at the optimal solution. The rest of the section
constitutes the proof of Theorem 3.3. Assume v = x∗ >Ay∗, i.e., v is the value of the bilinear
function x>Ay at the optimal solution. We will analyze the Jacobian computed at (x∗,y∗,x∗,y∗)10.
Assume i /∈ Supp(x∗), then
∂g1,i
∂xi
=
eη(Ay
∗)i∑
x∗t eη(Ay
∗)t
=
eη(Ay
∗)i
eηv
and all other partial derivatives of g1,i are zero, thus
eη(Ay
∗)i
eηv is an eigenvalue of the Jacobian
computed at (x∗,y∗,x∗,y∗). Moreover because of uniqueness of the optimal solution, it holds that
eη(Ay
∗)i
eηv < 1 because (Ay
∗)i − v < 0 (check Lemma C.3 in [13] for a proof, where they use Farkas’
Lemma to show it). Similarly, it holds for j /∈ Supp(y∗) that ∂g2,j∂yj = e
−η(A>x∗)j
e−ηv < 1 (again by C.3 in
9Since the dynamical system is from a quadruple to a quadruple, it is a neighborhood of (x∗,y∗,x∗,y∗).
10See also Equations (14) of the Jacobian computed at (x∗,y∗,x∗,y∗).
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[13] it holds that (Ax∗)j − v > 0) and all other partial derivatives of g2,j are zero, hence e
−η(A>x∗)j
e−ηv
is an eigenvalue of the Jacobian computed at the optimal solution.
Let Dx be the diagonal matrix of size |Supp(x∗)| × |Supp(x∗)| that has on the diagonal the
nonzero entries of x∗ and similarly we define Dy of size |Supp(y∗)| × |Supp(y∗)|. We set k1 =
|Supp(x∗)|, k2 = |Supp(y∗)| and k = k1 + k2. Let x′,y′ be the optimal solution to the min-max
problem with payoff matrix the corresponding submatrix of payoff matrix A (denoted by B) after
removing the rows/columns which correspond to the coordinates that are not in the support of the
unique optimal solution (x∗,y∗)11. We consider the submatrix J˜ of the Jacobian matrix that is
created by removing rows and columns of the corresponding coordinates that are not in the support
of optimum (for the variables x and y, these are exactly n+m− k). It is clear from above, that the
Jacobian of OMWU has eigenvalues with absolute value less than one iff J˜ has as well. After also
removing the rows (and the corresponding columns) that have only zero entries (these are exactly
n+m− k, result zero eigenvalues and correspond to variables z and w) the resulting submatrix
(denote it by J) boils down to the following:
J =

Ik1×k1 −Dx1k11>k1 2ηDx(B − v1k11>k2) 0k1×k1 −ηDx(B − v1k11>k2)
2ηDy(v1k21
>
k1
−B>) Ik2×k2 −Dy1k21>k2 −ηDy(v1k21>k1 −B>) 0k2×k2
Ik1×k1 0k1×k2 0k1×k1 0k1×k2
0k2×k1 Ik2×k2 0k2×k1 0k2×k2
 .
(9)
It is clear that (1k1 ,0k2 ,0k1 ,0k2), (0k1 ,1k2 ,0k1 ,0k2) are left eigenvectors with eigenvalues zero and
thus any right eigenvector (x˜, y˜, z˜, w˜) with nonzero eigenvalue has the property that x˜>1k1 = 0
and y˜>1k2 = 0. Hence every nonzero eigenvalue of the matrix above is an eigenvalue of the matrix
below:
Jnew =

Ik1×k1 2ηDxB 0k1×k1 −ηDxB
−2ηDyB> Ik2×k2 ηDyB> 0k2×k2
Ik1×k1 0k1×k2 0k1×k1 0k1×k2
0k2×k1 Ik2×k2 0k2×k1 0k2×k2
 . (10)
Let p(λ) be the characteristic polynomial of the matrix (10). After row/column operations it boils
down to
(−1)kdet
(
λ(1− λ)Ik1×k1 (2λ− 1)ηDxB
−η(2λ− 1)DyB> λ(1− λ)Ik2×k2
)
= (1− 2λ)kq
(
λ(λ− 1)
2λ− 1
)
, (11)
where q(λ) is the characteristic polynomial of
Jsmall =
(
0k1×k1 ηDxB
−ηDyB> 0k2×k2
)
. (12)
Observe that
Jsmall ·
(
Dx 0k1×k2
0k2×k1 Dy
)
is real skew symmetric,
and hence by Lemma B.6, Jsmall has eigenvalues of the form
12 ±iητ with τ ∈ R (i.e., imaginary
eigenvalues; we include η in the expression to conclude that σ := ητ can be sufficiently small in
absolute value). We conclude that any nonzero eigenvalue λ of the matrix J should satisfy the
equation λ(λ−1)2λ−1 = iσ for some small in absolute value σ ∈ R. Finally we get that
λ =
1 + 2iσ ±√1− 4σ2
2
.
11Note that (x′,y′) should be the unique optimal solution to the min-max problem with payoff matrix B.
12We denote i =
√−1.
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We compute the square of the magnitude of λ and we get |λ|2 = 2−4σ2±2
√
1−4σ2+4σ2
4 =
1±√1−4σ2
2 < 1
unless σ = 0 (i.e., τ = 0). If σ = 0, it means that Jnew has an eigenvalue which is equal to one.
Assume that (x˜, y˜, x˜, y˜) is the corresponding right eigenvector, it holds that By˜ = 0 and B>x˜ = 0.
Assume also that there exists an eigenvalue that is equal to one in the original matrix J . It follows
that 1>k2 y˜ = 0 and 1
>
k1
x˜ = 0. It holds that x˜ = 0k1 and y˜ = 0k2 otherwise (x
′,y′) + t(x˜, y˜) would
be another optimal solution (for the min-max problem with payoff matrix B; by padding zeros
to the vector, we could create another optimal solution for the original min-max problem with
payoff matrix A) for small enough t. We reached contradiction because we have assumed uniqueness.
Hence all the eigenvalues of J are less than 1, i.e., the mapping is a contraction mapping and the
proof is complete.
4 Experiments
The purpose of our experiments is primarily to understand how the speed of convergence of OMWU
dynamics (5) scales with the size of matrix A. Moreover, for A of fixed size, we are interested in
how the speed of convergence scales with the error of the output of OMWU dynamics. By error we
mean the `1 distance between the last iterate of OMWU and the optimal solution.
For the former case, we fix the error to be 0.1 and we run OMWU for n = 25, 50, ..., 250 where
the input matrix A has size n× n with entries i.i.d random variables sampled from uniform [−1, 1].
We output the number of iterations OMWU needs starting from uniform ( 1n , ...,
1
n) to reach a
solution that is at most 0.1 away from optimal in `1 distance. We note that we computed the
optimal solutions using LP-solvers.
For the latter case, we fix n = 50 and we consider the error  to be {0.5, 0.25, 0.0625, 0.015625, 0.007812}.
Starting from uniform distribution, we count the number of iterations to reach error . The stepsize
η is fixed at 0.01 at all times. The results can be found in the figure below (Figure 4). If we had to
guess, it seems that the relation between dimension and iterations is between linear and quadratic
(i.e., OMWU dynamics has roughly cubic-quartic running time in n if we count the cost of each
iteration as quadratic) and the dependence between error  and iterations t seems like t is inverse
polynomial in .
We note the importance of stepsize η. η must be sufficiently small for our proofs to work. If
η is chosen to be big, then OMWU might not converge (might cycle, we observed such behavior
in experiments). On the other hand, the smaller η is chosen, the smaller the progress of OMWU
dynamics (see the inequality claim for KL divergence) and hence the slower the dynamics.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we showed that a no-regret algorithm called Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Update
(OMWU) converges pointwise to a Nash equilibrium in two player zero sum games (See also a
concurrent work to ours [14], in which the authors provide a pointwise result about other dynamics,
using different techniques). Our analysis is novel and does not follow the standard approaches of
the literature of no-regret learning. We believe that our techniques can be useful in the analysis of
other learning algorithms with no provable guarantees of pointwise convergence.
One interesting open question is to show that OMWU algorithm converges in polynomial time
in n,m (for proper choice of stepsize η) and find exact rates of convergence. Another possible future
direction is to generalize our results about OMWU beyond the bilinear setting.
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(a) In the x axis we have the number of rows of a square
matrix A and on y axis the number of iterations of
OMWU. This figure captures how the number of iter-
ations depends on the dimensionality of the min-max
problem.
(b) In the x axis we have the number of iterations
of OMWU and on y axis the `1 distance from
the optimal solution. This figure captures how
the number of iterations scales with the error.
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A Equations of the Jacobian of OMWU dynamics
A.1 Equations computed at point (x, y, z, w)
Set Sx =
∑n
t=1 xte
2η(Ay)t−η(Aw)t , Sy =
∑m
t=1 yte
−2η(A>x)t+η(A>z)t and let i, j be arbitrary indexes
(g1,i captures the i-th coordinate of function g1 etc),
∂g1,i
∂xi
= e
2η(Ay)i−η(Aw)i
Sx
− xi (e
2η(Ay)i−η(Aw)i)
2
S2x
for all i ∈ [n],
∂g1,i
∂xj
= −xie2η(Ay)j−η(Aw)j · e2η(Ay)i−η(Aw)iS2x for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [n] and j 6= i,
∂g1,i
∂yj
= xie
2η(Ay)i−η(Aw)i · 2ηAijSx−2η
∑
t Atjxte
2η(Ay)t−η(Aw)t
S2x
for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m],
∂g1,i
∂zj
= 0 for all i, j ∈ [n],
∂g1,i
∂wj
= xie
2η(Ay)i−η(Aw)i · −ηAijSx+η
∑
t Atjxte
2η(Ay)t−η(Aw)t
S2x
for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m],
∂g2,i
∂yi
= e
−2η(A>x)i+η(A>z)i
Sy
− yi
(
e−2η(A
>x)i+η(A>z)i
)2
S2y
for all i ∈ [m],
∂g2,i
∂yj
= −yie−2η(A>x)j+η(A>z)j · e−2η(A
>x)i+η(A>z)i
S2y
for all i ∈ [m], j ∈ [m] and j 6= i,
∂g2,i
∂xj
= yie
−2η(A>x)i+η(A>z)i · −2ηA
>
ijSy+2η
∑
t A
>
tjyte
−2η(A>x)t+η(A>z)t
S2y
for all i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n],
∂g2,i
∂zj
= yie
−2η(A>x)i+η(A>z)i · ηA
>
ijSy−η
∑
t A
>
tjxte
−2η(A>x)t+η(A>z)t
S2y
for all i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n],
∂g2,i
∂wj
= 0 for any i, j ∈ [m],
∂g3,i
∂xi
= 1 for all i ∈ [n] and zero all the other partial derivatives of g3,i,
∂g4,i
∂yi
= 1 for all i ∈ [m] and zero all the other partial derivatives of g4,i.
(13)
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A.2 Equations computed at point (x∗, y∗, x∗, y∗)
Set Sx =
∑n
t=1 x
∗
t e
η(Ay∗)t , Sy =
∑m
t=1 y
∗
t e
−η(A>x∗)t and let i, j be arbitrary indexes (g1,i captures
the i-th coordinate of function g1 etc). Assume v = x
∗>Ay∗, it is not hard to see that (A>x∗)i =
(Ay∗)j = v for all i ∈ Supp(x∗), j ∈ Supp(y∗) and Sx = eηv, Sy = e−ηv. We get that:
∂g1,i
∂xi
= 1− x∗i for all i ∈ Supp(x∗),
∂g1,i
∂xi
= e
η(Ay∗)i
eηv for all i /∈ Supp(x∗),
∂g1,i
∂xj
= −x∗i for all i, j ∈ Supp(x∗) and j 6= i,
∂g1,i
∂xj
= 0 for all i /∈ Supp(x∗), j ∈ [n] and j 6= i,
∂g1,i
∂yj
= x∗i (2ηAij − 2ηv) for all i ∈ Supp(x∗), j ∈ Supp(y∗),
∂g1,i
∂yj
= 0 for all i /∈ Supp(x∗), j ∈ [m],
∂g1,i
∂zj
= 0 for all i, j ∈ [n],
∂g1,i
∂wj
= x∗i (−ηAij + ηv) for all i ∈ Supp(x∗), j ∈ Supp(y∗),
∂g1,i
∂wj
= 0 for all i /∈ Supp(x∗), j ∈ [m],
∂g2,i
∂yi
= 1− y∗i for all i ∈ Supp(y∗),
∂g2,i
∂yi
= e
−η(Ax∗)i
e−ηv for all i /∈ Supp(y∗),
∂g2,i
∂yj
= −y∗i for all i, j ∈ Supp(y∗) and j 6= i,
∂g2,i
∂yj
= 0 for all i /∈ Supp(y∗), j ∈ [m] and j 6= i,
∂g2,i
∂xj
= y∗i (−2ηA>ij + 2ηv) for all i ∈ Supp(y∗), j ∈ Supp(x∗),
∂g2,i
∂xj
= 0 for all i /∈ Supp(y∗), j ∈ [n],
∂g2,i
∂zj
= y∗i (ηA
>
ij − ηv) for all i ∈ Supp(y∗), j ∈ Supp(x∗),
∂g2,i
∂zj
= 0 for all i /∈ Supp(y∗), j ∈ [n],
∂g2,i
∂wj
= 0 for any i, j ∈ [m],
∂g3,i
∂xi
= 1 for all i ∈ [n] and zero all the other partial derivatives of g3,i,
∂g4,i
∂yi
= 1 for all i ∈ [m] and zero all the other partial derivatives of g4,i.
(14)
B Missing claims and proofs
Lemma B.1 shows that the change between next and current iterate in both OMWU algorithms
(classic and linear variant) is of order O(η) and that the difference between the next iterate of both
algorithms is O(η2).
Lemma B.1. Let x ∈ ∆n be the vector of the max player, w, z ∈ ∆m and suppose x′,x′′ are the
next iterates of OMWU and its linear variant with current vector x and vectors w, z of the min
player. It holds that
∥∥x′ − x′′∥∥
1
is O(η2), and
∥∥x′ − x∥∥
1
,
∥∥x′′ − x∥∥
1
are O(η).
Analogously, it holds for vector y ∈ ∆m of the min player and its next iterates.
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Proof. Let η be sufficiently small (smaller than maximum in absolute value entry of A).
|x′i − x′′i | = xi
∣∣∣∣∣ e2η(Aw)i−η(Az)i∑
j xje
2η(Aw)j−η(Az)j −
1 + 2η(Aw)i − η(Az)i∑
j xj(1 + 2η(Aw)j − η(Az)j)
∣∣∣∣∣
= xi
∣∣∣∣∣ 1 + 2η(Aw)i − η(Az)i ±O(η2)∑j xj(1 + 2η(Aw)j − η(Az)j)±O(η2) − 1 + 2η(Aw)j − η(Az)j∑j xj(1 + 2η(Aw)j − η(Az)j)
∣∣∣∣∣
which is O(η2)xi
and hence ‖x′ − x′′‖1 is O(η2). Moreover we have that
|xi − x′′i | = xi
∣∣∣∣∣1− 1 + 2η(Aw)i − η(Az)i∑j xj(1 + 2η(Aw)i − η(Az)i)
∣∣∣∣∣
= xi
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j xj(1 + 2η(Aw)j − η(Az)j)− (1 + 2η(Aw)i − η(Az)i)∑
j xj(1 + 2η(Aw)i − η(Az)i)
∣∣∣∣∣
= xi
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j xj(2η(Aw)j − η(Az)j)− 2η(Aw)i + η(Az)i∑
j xj(1 + 2η(Aw)i − η(Az)i)
∣∣∣∣∣ which is O(η)xi.
By triangle inequality and the two above proofs we get the third part of the lemma.
Lemmas B.2, B.3 and B.5 will be used in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Lemma B.2. Let x ∈ ∆n, w, z ∈ ∆m and suppose x′,x′′ are the next iterates of OMWU and its
linear variant with current vector x and inputs w, z, i.e., x′ has coordinates x′i = xi
e2η(Aw)i−η(Az)i∑
j xje
2η(Aw)j−η(Az)j
and x′′ has coordinates x′′i = xi
1+2η(Aw)i−η(Az)i∑
j xj(1+2η(Aw)j−η(Az)j) . It holds that (for η sufficiently small)
ηx′>A(2w − z)− ηx>A(2w − z) =
=
(
ηx′′>A(2w − z)− ηx>A(2w − z)
)
−O(η3) =
= (1−O(η))η2
∑
i
xi(2x
>Aw − x>Az− 2(Aw)i + (Az)i)2 −O(η3)
= (1−O(η))η2
∑
i
x′i(2x
′>Aw − x′>Az− 2(Aw)i + (Az)i)2 −O(η3).
Proof. It suffices to prove the second equality. The rest follow from Lemma B.1. Set B = (1n1
>
m+ηA).
We have that x′′i = xi
(B(2w−z))i
x>B(2w−z) (from definition of linear variant of OMWU dynamics). It follows
that
(x′′>B(2w − z)) · (x>B(2w − z)) =
∑
ij
Bijx
′′
i (2w − z)j ·
(
x>B(2w − z)
)
=
∑
ij
Bij
(
xi
(B(2w − z))i
x>B(2w − z)
)
(2w − z)j ·
(
x>B(2w − z)
)
=
∑
ij
Bij (xi(B(2w − z)i)) (2w − z)j
=
∑
i
xi(B(2w − z))2i
= (x>B(2w − z))2 +
∑
i
xi(x
>B(2w − z)− (B(2w − z))i)2.
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where the last inequality comes from the fact that for a random variable ξ we have E[ξ2] = E2[ξ]+V[ξ].
Therefore by diving LHS and RHS by x>B(2w − z) which is 1±O(η) we get
(x′′>B(2w − z)) = (x>B(2w − z)) + (1−O(η))
∑
i
xi(x
>B(2w − z)− (B(2w − z))i)2
= (x>(1n1>m + ηA)(2w − z))+
+ (1−O(η))η2
∑
i
xi(x
>A(2w − z)− (A(2w − z))i)2.
The proof is complete by Lemma B.1.
Using same arguments as in proof of Lemma B.2 we have the following lemma:
Lemma B.3. Let y ∈ ∆m , w, z ∈ ∆n and suppose y′ is the next iterate of OMWU with current
vector y and inputs w, z, i.e., y′ has coordinates y′i = yi
e−2η(A
>w)i+η(A>z)i∑
j yje
−2η(A>w)j+η(A>z)j
. It holds that (for η
sufficiently small)
ηy′>A>(z− 2w)− ηy>A>(z− 2w)
= (1−O(η))η2
∑
i
y′i(y
′>A>z− 2y′>A>w − (A>z)i + 2(A>w)i)2 −O(η3).
Lemma B.4. Let (xt,yt) be the t-th iterate of OMWU dynamics (5). For each time step t ≥ 2 it
holds that
ηxt−1 >Ayt − ηxt >Ayt−1 ≤
≤ −(1−O(η))η2
∑
i
xti(2x
t>Ayt − xt>Ayt−1 − 2(Ayt)i + (Ayt−1)i)2−
− (1−O(η))η2
∑
i
yti(y
t>A>xt−1 − 2yt>A>xt − (A>xt−1)i + 2(A>xt)i)2 +O(η3).
Proof.
ηxt−1 >Ayt − ηxt >Ayt−1 = ηxt−1 >Ayt − 1
2
ηxt−1 >Ayt−1 +
1
2
ηxt−1 >Ayt−1 − ηxt >Ayt−1
= ηxt >Ayt − 1
2
ηxt >Ayt−1 +
1
2
ηxt−1 >Ayt − ηxt >Ayt−
− (1
2
−O(η))η2
∑
i
xti(2x
t>Ayt − xt>Ayt−1 − 2(Ayt)i + (Ayt−1)i)2−
− (1
2
−O(η))η2
∑
i
yti(y
t>A>xt−1 − 2yt>A>xt − (A>xt−1)i+
+ 2(A>xt)i)2 +O(η3).
The second equality comes from Lemmas B.2 and B.3. By canceling out the common terms and
bring to the LHS the appropriate remaining terms, the claim follows.
Lemma B.5. Let (xt,yt) denote the t-th iterate of OMWU dynamics. It holds for t ≥ 2 that
x∗ >A(2yt − yt−1) ≥ x∗ >Ay∗ and (2xt > − xt−1 >)Ay∗ ≤ x∗ >Ay∗,
where (x∗,y∗) is the optimal solution of the min-max problem.
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Proof. It is true that xti ≥ (1 − O(η))xt−1i , hence xti ≥ 12xt−1i for η sufficiently small. Therefore
2xt − xt−1 lies in the simplex ∆n. Hence since (x∗,y∗) is the optimum (Nash equilibrium) we get
that (2xt > − xt−1 >)Ay∗ ≤ x∗ >Ay∗ (x is the max player). Similarly the second inequality can be
proved.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We compute the difference between
DKL((x
∗,y∗)||(xt+1,yt+1)) and DKL((x∗,y∗)||(xt,yt))
DKL((x
∗,y∗)||(xt+1,yt+1))−DKL((x∗,y∗)||(xt,yt)) = −
(∑
i
x∗i ln
xt+1i
xti
+
∑
i
y∗i ln
yt+1i
yti
)
=−
(∑
i
x∗i ln e
2η(Ayt)i−η(Ayt−1)i +
∑
i
y∗i ln e
−2η(A>xt)i+η(A>xt−1)i
)
+
+ ln
(∑
i
xtie
2η(Ayt)i−η(Ayt−1)i
)
+ ln
(∑
i
ytie
−2η(A>xt)i+η(A>xt−1)i
)
=−2ηx∗ >Ayt + ηx∗ >Ayt−1 + 2ηxt >Ay∗ − ηxt−1 >Ay∗+
+ ln
(∑
i
xtie
2η(Ayt)i−η(Ayt−1)i
)
+ ln
(∑
i
ytie
−2η(A>xt)i+η(A>xt−1)i
)
.
We use Lemma B.5 and we get that −2ηx∗ >Ayt + ηx∗ >Ayt−1 + 2ηxt >Ay∗ − ηxt−1 >Ay∗ ≤ 0,
therefore the LHS (difference in the KL divergence) is at most
≤
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−2ηxt >Ayt + ηxt >Ayt−1 + 2ηxt >Ayt − ηxt−1 >Ayt − ηxt >Ayt−1 + ηxt−1 >Ayt +
+ ln
(∑
i
xtie
2η(Ayt)i−η(Ayt−1)i
)
+ ln
(∑
i
ytie
−2η(A>xt)i+η(A>xt−1)i
)
= ln
(∑
i
xtie
2η((Ayt)i−xt >Ayt)−η((Ayt−1)i−xt >Ayt−1)
)
+
+ ln
(∑
i
ytie
−2η((A>xt)i−xt >Ayt)+η((A>xt−1)i−xt−1 >Ayt)
)
− ηxt >Ayt−1 + ηxt−1 >Ayt
We furthermore use second order Taylor approximation (η is sufficiently small) to the function ex
and we get that previous expression is at most
≤ ln(
∑
i
xti
(
1 + 2η((Ayt)i − xt >Ayt)− η((Ayt−1)i − xt >Ayt−1)
)
+
+
∑
i
xti
(
(
1
2
+O(η))η2
(
2(Ayt)i − 2xt >Ayt − (Ayt−1)i + xt >Ayt−1
)2)
)+
+ ln(
∑
i
yti
(
1− 2η((A>xt)i − xt >Ayt) + η((A>xt−1)i − xt−1 >Ayt)
)
+
+
∑
i
yti
(
(
1
2
+O(η))η2
(
2(A>xt)i − 2xt >Ayt − (A>xt−1)i + xt−1 >Ayt
)2)
)−
− ηxt >Ayt−1 + ηxt−1 >Ayt
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Finally, using Taylor approximation on log(1 + x) and Lemma B.4 (last equality) we get the
following system:
≤ ηxt−1 >Ayt − ηxt >Ayt−1+
+
∑
i
xti
(
(
1
2
+O(η))η2
(
2(Ayt)i − 2xt >Ayt − (Ayt−1)i + xt >Ayt−1
)2)
+
+
∑
i
yti
(
(
1
2
+O(η))η2
(
2(A>xt)i − 2xt >Ayt − (A>xt−1)i + xt−1 >Ayt
)2)
= −
∑
i
xti
(
(
1
2
−O(η))η2
(
2(Ayt)i − 2xt >Ayt − (Ayt−1)i + xt >Ayt−1
)2)
−
∑
i
yti
(
(
1
2
−O(η))η2
(
2(A>xt)i − 2xt >Ayt − (A>xt−1)i + xt−1 >Ayt
)2)
+O(η3).
It is clear that as long as (xt,yt) (and thus (xt−1,yt−1) by Lemma B.1) is not O(η1/3)-close, from
above inequalities/equalities we get
DKL((x
∗,y∗)||(xt+1,yt+1))−DKL((x∗,y∗)||(xt,yt)) ≤ −Ω(η3),
meaning that KL divergence decreases by at least a factor of η3 and the claim follows.
Lemma B.6. Let D be a real diagonal matrix with positive diagonal entries and S be a real skew-
symmetric matrix (S> = −S). It holds that SD has eigenvalues with real part zero (i.e., it has only
imaginary eigenvalues).
Proof. Let z∗ be the conjugate transpose of z and z∗ be a left eigenvector of SD with complex
eigenvalue λ. It holds that
λz∗D−1z = z∗SDD−1z
= z∗Sz
= −(z∗Sz)∗ (since S is skew symmetric)
= −(λz∗D−1z)∗ (using first and second equalities above)
= −λz∗D−1z.
Since D has positive diagonal entries, we conclude that z∗D−1z 6= 0 (since z 6= 0), thus λ = −λ and
the claim follows.
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